The Climate Solidarity Dilemma: A Thought Experiment on the Conditions for Successful Collective Action
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Preamble
For 25 years, I’ve dedicated my life to advancing climate action. Much of this time has been spent working on technical solutions, such as the carbon removal strategy of biochar production and application. I am also keenly aware that even with all the technical solutions we need to mitigate the climate crisis, their success ultimately depends on our collective choice to use them—and this choice is far from guaranteed.
In the early decades of climate action, progress was hindered by a lack of public awareness. Today, however, we may have reached a point of diminishing returns on raising awareness. The challenge now is not just to recognize the problem but to galvanize a critical mass of support for the solutions that are needed.
This thought experiment has been brewing in my mind for some time. It explores the decisions each of us faces in confronting a problem that none of us can solve alone. It is a reflection on the tension between individual and collective action, and the conditions necessary for successful cooperation in the face of a global crisis.
NOTE: This is a thought experiment, a simplified hypothetical framework designed to explore key concepts. It is not a comprehensive representation of reality but a tool for reflection and analysis.
(This draft of the thought experiment and its scenarios were developed in collaboration with an AI language model (DeepSeek-V3) to refine and expand on the original ideas.)
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The Climate Solidarity Dilemma: A Thought Experiment on the Conditions for Successful Collective Action
Overview:
This thought experiment explores the tension between individual and collective rationality in climate action, drawing parallels to the Prisoner’s Dilemma.
The Framework:
Imagine you represent a group—such as a business, nation, or NGO—that has a reserve of extra resources beyond what is needed for day-to-day operations. Each year, your group faces a binary choice:
1.) Invest in Climate Mitigation: Use your extra resources to reduce global greenhouse gas emissions or support other efforts to limit climate change. While this benefits all of humanity indirectly, the impact of your contribution depends on whether a critical mass of other groups also chooses mitigation.
2.) Invest in Adaptation: Use your extra resources to protect your group directly—building flood defenses, relocating infrastructure, or expanding wealth and power to secure future advantages. However, choosing adaptation undermines collective confidence in achieving critical mass for mitigation, creating a feedback loop that makes global cooperation less likely.
The Constraints:
1.) There is a limited time window (e.g., 15 years) in which climate mitigation can be effective. After this period, the compounding effects of ecological tipping points (e.g., irreversible ice sheet collapse, biodiversity loss) and social disruption (e.g., mass migration, resource conflicts) will overwhelm systems, leaving no extra resources for mitigation. At that point, all resources will be devoted to day-to-day survival.
2.) Success in climate mitigation is a binary outcome, either pass or fail, and success can only be achieved if a critical mass of groups collectively chooses to invest in it within the allotted time. If too few groups participate, mitigation efforts will fail, and adaptation will become the only viable option for everyone.
The Core Dilemma:
Each group faces a rational incentive to prioritize adaptation, as it provides direct, guaranteed benefits—whether through immediate resilience measures or the accumulation of wealth and power to secure future advantages. However, if all groups act in their immediate self-interest, mitigation efforts will fail, leading to catastrophic consequences for everyone.
Implications:
The individual choice to mitigate rather than adapt has a cascading effect: it builds trust in the collective effort of mitigation, making it more likely that others will choose the same. The individual choice to adapt rather than mitigate also has a cascading effect: it undermines trust in the collective effort of mitigation, making it even harder to achieve the critical mass needed. These choices can be influenced by both external and internal factors, and it is interesting to consider the scenarios in which one choice or the other becomes the rational decision.
This thought experiment is useful in exploring the importance of trust, cooperation, and shared responsibility in addressing the unique global challenge of climate change. Ultimately, it underlines the role of solidarity as an important factor in successfully mitigating climate change.
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Scenarios Where Mitigation is the Rational Choice
Scenario 1: High Trust and Strong Coordination Mechanisms
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Conditions: Groups have established strong institutions or agreements (e.g., binding international treaties, carbon credit systems) that ensure collective action. There is high trust that others will also contribute to mitigation.
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Rationale: With confidence that a critical mass will be achieved, investing in mitigation maximizes long-term benefits for all, including your group. The risk of free-riding is minimized, and the collective payoff outweighs individual short-term gains from adaptation.
Scenario 2: Early Action with High Momentum
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Conditions: A significant number of groups have already committed to mitigation early in the time window (e.g., within the first 5 years), creating momentum and demonstrating that critical mass is achievable.
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Rationale: Joining the effort early increases the likelihood of success and avoids the risk of being left with no viable mitigation options later. The collective benefits of avoiding catastrophic climate change far outweigh the immediate gains from adaptation.
Scenario 3: Severe Consequences of Inaction
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Conditions: Scientific evidence shows that failing to mitigate will lead to existential threats for your group (e.g., sea-level rise that will submerge your territory, or crop failures that will devastate your economy).
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Rationale: Even if other groups are unreliable, the catastrophic risks of inaction make mitigation the only viable long-term strategy. Adaptation and wealth accumulation cannot address the scale of the threat, so investing in mitigation becomes a survival imperative.
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Scenarios Where Adaptation is the Rational Choice
Scenario 4: Low Trust and Fragmented Coordination
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Conditions: Groups are highly distrustful of each other, and there are no effective mechanisms to enforce collective action (e.g., weak international agreements, lack of transparency). Many groups are already prioritizing adaptation and wealth accumulation.
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Rationale: Without confidence that others will contribute to mitigation, investing in adaptation or wealth hoarding ensures your group’s immediate survival and future advantage. Mitigation efforts would likely be wasted if critical mass is not achieved, making adaptation the safer choice.
Scenario 5: Late in the Time Window with No Critical Mass
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Conditions: The time window for effective mitigation is nearly over (e.g., year 14 of 15), and it is clear that critical mass will not be achieved. Most groups have already shifted to adaptation.
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Rationale: At this point, mitigation efforts are too little, too late. Investing in adaptation ensures your group is as prepared as possible for the inevitable impacts of climate change, rather than wasting resources on a lost cause.
Scenario 6: Limited Resources and High Vulnerability
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Conditions: Your group has very limited extra resources and is highly vulnerable to immediate climate impacts (e.g., a small island nation facing rising sea levels).
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Rationale: With scarce resources, your group cannot afford to gamble on mitigation, which may not succeed due to lack of collective action. Prioritizing adaptation or wealth accumulation ensures that your group can survive in the short term and secure future advantages, even if the long-term outlook is bleak.
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